Working Papers
Abstract
This experiment tests Bayesian persuasion in a simple setting. We adopt an experimental design in which the Sender chooses a partition of the state space, which frees the Receiver from conditional probability calculations. We find that the Senders generally fully reveal the weaker signal but persistently set the stronger signal too weak, resulting in frequent persuasion failure. However, when they know the Receiver's strategy, most Senders persuade optimally. Our findings suggest that learning the key strategic element of Bayesian Persuasion is easy, but determining the posterior probability needed to persuade a human Receiver is hard for the Senders.
Strategic Experimentation with Pirate Barrel: An Experimental Study
Draft Under Revision
Draft Under Revision
Abstract
We study how people perform risky experimentation to generate information when they can also learn from each other. We develop and experimentally test a modified version of the Keller et al. (2005) two-armed bandit model. Our modified model predicts that the information generated by a group of players is no more than that generated by a single player in any perfect Bayes equilibrium. To implement this model in the lab, we design a novel dynamic information structure that can trivialize the posterior calculation for any sequence of signal realizations. We find that 1) when experimenting alone, the median subject generates almost exactly the same amount as the theoretical prediction, that 2) when experimenting with others, the median subject tends to generate more information than when alone, which is against the theoretical prediction, and that 3) the subjects only react to the posterior belief and do not condition their actions on what other players’ past actions, thus the folk theorem breaks down completely in our infinitely repeated environment.
Works in Progress
Inference from Frequency of Signals
(with Pak Hung Au and Renkun Yang)
(with Pak Hung Au and Renkun Yang)
A Rational Bubble Experiment
(with Tian Xia)
(with Tian Xia)
A Field Experiment on Food Delivery Workers
(with Minhee Chae and Bo Wang)
(with Minhee Chae and Bo Wang)
Bandit Complementarity Design
